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Introduction
The autonomy of individual human agents, particularly when
construed as the capacity to govern freely one’s own actions, has often
served as a principal marker of the cultures of Western modernity.
Whether one is, in Charles Taylor’s terms, a “booster” or a “knocker”
of modernity, individual autonomy looms large as a defining feature of
what each recognizes as a characteristically modern account of what it
means to be human. Yet, even though autonomy has taken center
stage in modernity, it is useful to recall that modern thinkers were not
the first to construe self-governance of one’s actions as an important
ingredient in the exercise of morally responsible human agency.1
Once we attend to the fact that a capacity for self-governance is
central to traditions of moral discourse and reflection that focus on
virtue and character as structurally constitutive of moral agency, the
emergence of autonomy as a core element in the dynamics of
modernity can no longer be considered to issue primarily from an
insight totally original with “modernity” about the form, operation, or
capacity of human agency.2 In this respect, the emphasis the ethics of
modernity places on autonomy may not be so much a major break
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from previous ways of construing agency as it is a significant
enhancement of a role that the moral traditions from which the ethics
of modernity emerged had already given to responsible selfgovernance within the structure of moral agency.
Kant, whose work plays a formative role in placing responsibility
for one’s own self-governance at center stage of discussions of moral
agency, is instructive on this point: In his seminal treatment of
autonomy in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals he explicitly
presents his account as nothing more than a precise articulation of a
principle which every agent already grasps, as a matter of practical
knowledge, in acting morally.3 This principle bears upon the manner in
which the exercise of moral agency carries within its very form a
commitment to order one’s actions to unconditioned good, i.e., to that
good which requires, under penalty of rendering one’s agency
practically unintelligible, unconditional recognition by all rational
agents.4
Why might it be significant to point out that, even as autonomy
has served as a defining marker of moral agency for the cultures of
modernity (and remains so in the aftermath of modernity), it has
fundamental antecedents in traditions of understanding human agency
that antedate the modernity that gives autonomy such prominence? In
what follows, I argue that understanding autonomy within a context
locating its continuity with the long stream of moral reflection that
Alan Donagan designates “the common morality”5 is significant for two
reasons. First, it allows us to see how it need not be the case that
autonomy is inevitably packaged with the “isms”—e.g., individualism,
relativism, subjectivism—that the “knockers” of modernity have
inveighed against, and, often enough, “boosters” of modernity have
celebrated among its glories. Second, dislodging autonomy from its
presumed home in the dynamics of social atomism and resituating it
as embedded in a mutual recognition of agency that is expressed in
practices of social respect6 provides a basis for a different construal of
its relation to faith. In accord with this proposed social reading of
autonomy, I will then show how faith, understood as an affirmation of
an order of transcendence that makes possible the robust exercise of
human moral finitude, may be construed to offer to the structure and
workings of autonomous moral agency a formative social context that
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is particularly fitting for moral engagement with a secular age’s
fracturing interplay of contingency.
Making the case for the first reason is the task of Part I. This
involves exploring the social dimensions of Kant’s account of moral
agency that, long overlooked in many standard twentieth
century readings of his ethics, have now been highlighted in a
significant body of scholarship published since the mid-1980s.7 Taking
these social dimensions into account, I argue, provides a basis for recontextualizing the role of autonomy in the dynamics of modernity in a
way that brings into question that part of the influential “subtraction”
narratives according to which the unfolding of modernity and secularity
has inexorably required the elimination of transcendence and the end
of religious faith. Such re-contextualization challenges narratives that
take autonomy as a fitting and, indeed, necessary trope for human
emancipation from God and from demands upon moral action indexed
to a transcendent order; it offers, instead, an account of autonomy in
which God’s transcendence renders intelligible an unreserved
affirmation of the full dignity and worth of the finitude of human
agency On a reading that attends to the social embedding of human
autonomy as a necessary condition for its intelligibility and exercise,
autonomy does not inevitably set humanity as a whole, nor individual
human agents, in a zero-sum agential competition with one another
(or, for that matter, with a transcendent God) in order for it to
function as the origin and ground of the principles of moral life.8
Indeed, it may be the case that humans can be properly autonomous
only to the extent that the exercise of their autonomy carries within it
an affirmation of moral normativity that is not merely immanent to
human subjectivity but is referenced to an order that can be
legitimately designated as “objective” as well as “transcendent.”
This social re-contextualization of autonomy has consequences
both for a larger recasting of the narratives of modernity and
secularity and for the efforts of this volume to articulate how faith9
can engage the socio-political order of a secular age. Such recontextualization places in question those narratives of modernity and
secularity that frame autonomy as the paradigmatic form of human
moral agency that inevitably eventuates in intractable opposition to
faith as a locus for principles for morally responsible conduct. In
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contrast, this social re-contextualization does not take it to be the case
that autonomy inevitably stands in incompatible rivalry to faith as a
principle for the integrity of moral agency, nor that faith necessarily
functions as a heteronomous principle for moral agency. While it is of
major importance eventually to address this kind of “meta” question—
and Taylor’s work provides a range of strategies for doing so—that
task is not the primary one for this essay. That task, instead, is to
show how a socially robust understanding of autonomy bears upon
articulating possibilities for how moral agency, as reflectively formed in
a community in which faith enters the formative dynamics of agency,
appropriately engages pressing issues in the socio-political order. Such
possibilities for engagement should thus manifest the structural
capacity of an autonomous agency formed in faith to provide the
sphere of public discourse with responsible analyses and critiques of
these issues and constructive approaches for their resolution.
Part II of this essay will thus explore these possibilities, which
presuppose a reading of autonomy and faith as both embedded in a
mutual recognition of agency (in Kant’s terms, the relation that agents
bear to one another in “a kingdom of ends” or an “ethical
commonwealth”) that is expressed in practices of social respect.10 In
accord with this reading of autonomy, I will show how faith may be
construed so that it offers to autonomous agency a formative social
context that is particularly apt for responding to the moral challenges
posed by the fracturing interplay of contingency that marks a secular
age. This section will thus articulate a construal of faith in terms of
the enlarged social context it provides for the exercise of an autonomy
already referenced to practices of mutual recognition. I will argue that
faith offers to the social respect embedded in the structure of
autonomy an expansive horizon of welcoming of the other that brings
social respect to a completion fully inclusive of the range of otherness
before which our humanity stands.
I. The Finitude of Human Agency: The Commonwealth of
Autonomous Subjects in the Space of Contingency
In many readings of the intellectual trajectory of modernity and
secularity, Kant’s articulation of autonomy as crucial to human moral
agency plays a prominent role. Although Descartes is most often
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credited (and castigated) for fathering “the turn to the subject,” this
modern subject reaches full moral “adulthood” only as Kant makes it
possible for the subject to claim reflectively its own “autonomy of the
will” as “the supreme moral principle” for decision and conduct. It may
be an historical and conceptual oversimplification to argue that Kant’s
account of autonomy transposes the Cartesian “I think, therefore I
am” into “I will, therefore I am,” but Kant’s uncompromising
affirmation of the human subject’s moral freedom has, nonetheless,
often been read as providing moral subjectivity with a contour of selfdetermining agency that brings the chaos of moral relativism
inevitably in its wake. Embedded in such relativism, moreover, seems
to be an agential subjectivity that radically challenges any moral claim
made on behalf of a transcendent authority. On this reading, Kantian
autonomy begets a modern Protagorean relativism well suited to a
secular age in which God has been pronounced dead: Autonomy frees
each of us to decree what is right and what is good with a moral
authority once the prerogative of God.11
Iris Murdoch concluded her classic description of autonomy,
read as a cipher for an absolute moral subjectivism willfully displacing
God, with the devastating comment: “Kant’s [autonomous] man had
already received a glorious incarnation nearly a century earlier in the
work of Milton: His proper name is Lucifer.”12 More recently, Susan
Neiman, who does not read Kant as a relativist nor take his account of
autonomy to entail relativism, characterized the robustness with which
Kant affirms the autonomy of human freedom in terms that strikingly
resonate with Murdoch’s association of autonomy with godlike power.
Commenting on the “universal law of nature” formulation of the
categorical imperative, she notes “Universal laws can be imagined by
anyone; universal laws of nature are given by one Being alone. In
giving us this formula, Kant gave us a chance to pretend to be God.
Every time we face a moral dilemma, we are to imagine re-enacting
the Creation.”13
On Neiman’s reading, however, “playing God” in a Kantian
manner does not require us to place human agency in rivalry with
divine agency; it requires, instead, a recognition that fundamental to
the integrity of our human moral situation is the acknowledgment of
both the difference and the affinity between divine and human agency.
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That twofold acknowledgment then bears upon our capacity to
envision what human moral agency requires of us. She sees this
recognition as crucial to Kant’s articulation of the limits of theoretical
reason and the consequences those limits have for exercising practical
reason to shape our conduct: “Dissatisfaction [with the limits of our
knowledge] comes from the wish to be God. If any one claim is the
message of Kant’s metaphysics, this is it”14…“The desire to surpass our
limits is as essential to the structure of the human as the recognition
that we cannot.”15 On her account, the “wish to be God” does not, in
the first instance, stem from a will to exercise omnipotent power on
one’s own behalf; it arises from an experiential apprehension of the
depth to which contingency, as it escapes both our capacity for
understanding and the control of our finite agency, shapes the
trajectory of our lives: “Yet the wish to determine the world can’t be
coherently limited, for you cannot know which event will turn out to be
not just another event, but the one that will change your life”16…“The
wish to be God isn’t simply pathological; its alternative is blind trust in
the world to work as it should.”17
Neiman’s reading of the moral autonomy expressed in “the law
of nature” formulation takes on added significance for articulating the
place of human agency in a secular age once we note her placement of
the exercise of autonomy within Kant’s overall depiction of our human
situation, which he sees as inextricably tied to reason’s efforts to
render that situation intelligible, theoretically and practically, with
respect both to nature and to God. For Kant, contingency, and our
recognition of human finitude with respect to that contingency, are
central for the dynamics that give our human situation its moral and
its religious structure. He situates the operation of human autonomy
within the framework of a contingency, embedded in the workings of
both the cosmos and our agency, that serves as a marker for both the
limits of finite reason and the dynamism driving reason to surpass
those limits. On this reading of Kant, contingency presents no puzzle
for the use of our reason that, by seeking the principles at work in the
operations of nature, enables us to make sense of the world
theoretically: “Where it’s only a matter of knowledge, the fact that
what affects us is not created by us causes little problem.”18 Matters
stand differently, however, for our practical use of reason that seeks to
render ourselves and the world in which we must act morally
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intelligible: “It would be easy to acknowledge that not controlling the
world is part of being human, were it not for the fact that things go
wrong. The thought that the rift between reason and nature is neither
error nor punishment but the fault line along which the universe is
structured can be a source of perfect terror.”19
Behind the “wish to be God” thus lies a desire to rid the world of
the contingent, a desire that Neiman sees framing the central goal of
Hegel’s enterprise, even as Kant, on her reading, finds such a desire
both unavoidable and deeply problematic.20 It is problematic inasmuch
as Kant takes a capacity to conceal from ourselves the recognition that
we cannot surpass the limits of our human finitude to be embedded
within the structure of the human just as deeply as the wish to be
God: “Kant reminds us as often as possible of all that God can do and
all that we cannot. Nobody in the history of philosophy was more
aware of the number of ways we can forget it. He was equally
conscious of the temptation to idolatry, the alternative route to
confusing God with other beings.”21 Such inveterate capacity for selfconcealment of our limitation in the face of human reason’s
unbridled ambitions is precisely why our reason needs a discipline of
“critique” to train us in an intellectual humility from which we can
acknowledge that the dignity properly ours as human is inestimable
precisely in virtue of, not in spite of, our finitude. Kant recognizes that
our finitude is so deeply constitutive of the moral shape of human
agency that, were we to convince ourselves that we had succeeded in
overcoming the moral limits of our finitude, we would not thereby have
made our agency more “godly”; we would, instead, have deflated its
capacity to engage the play of contingency that stands at the core of
the human moral enterprise.
If Neiman’s reading is correct, she has identified a contrast
between Kant and Hegel that is crucial both for locating the different
influences their work has had on shaping the cultures of modernity and
for discerning how their work may—and may not—continue to provide
useful coordinates for navigating the aftermath of modernity in which
we find ourselves. Kant affirms, as Hegel does not, that the proper
relation between human finitude and divine transcendence is one that,
from the side of finite human reason, maintains, rather than seeks to
overcome, the difference between the finite in its full contingency and
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the transcendent in its fully radical and non-contingent otherness. On
Kant’s account, it is only in virtue of recognizing the difference
between the human and the divine—a recognition, moreover, that
acknowledges that overcoming that difference is not within our human
power—that it becomes possible for us to act in full and proper accord
with our human finitude. Human agency can be exercised in a fully
human manner only in function of an awareness and an affirmation—
often exacted from us neither readily nor easily—that the “godly”
perspective presented to us as a “universal law of nature” for our finite
agency to “enact” as pattern for our moral maxims does not thereby
enable us to act with an unfailingly omnipotent “godly” power of
doing “whatever we might wish.” That perspective enables us, rather,
to exercise a properly finite human power to do as we ought in a world
that contingency shapes.22
This contrast, in my judgment, renders Kant a more helpful ally
than Hegel for articulating the proper contours for understanding the
significance of the exercise of human agency in a secular/post-secular
age that poses fundamental challenges to the possibility and
intelligibility of faith as an appropriate human response to a
transcendence properly construed as divine. Neiman’s reading of this
contrast parses Kant’s account by attending to its affirmation of
finitude and contingency as that which provides human agency with its
fundamental moral range and depth, in contrast to Hegel’s affirmation
of the impetus to overcome them. This parsing helps to show how a
construal of the relationship between divine freedom and human
autonomy that pits them against one another as a “zero-sum” game
may miss both how radically different they are from each other and
why that difference is central for appropriately understanding what it is
to be human. One consequence of missing such a difference is that the
human freedom left as a legacy after the rival God has been declared
dead turns out to be small change indeed for any who expect
humanity thereby to gain moral capital sufficient to make the workings
of the world more reliably conducive to the flourishing of all. Inasmuch
as the obituary pronouncing God dead is also the news that God never
was, there now is one less suspect to blame when human things go
terribly amiss; that, however, hardly provides a guarantee that, in
consequence of a recognition of the (long-time) absence of God, we
have made our human selves better prepared, either now or for the
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future, to “do right” for the flourishing of our species and the
environing world in which we dwell. As Neiman astutely points out in
concluding her chapter on Nietzsche and Freud, the outcome of their
unmasking of the God-illusion is that “the price is enormous, for all
nature stands condemned. Human beings themselves become walking
indictments of creation.”23
Neiman is not the first to note that the death of God provides
impetus for lines of antihumanist thinking that consciously stand
against the centrality that the main currents of modernity give to the
human. The value of her analysis here lies not so much in the fact that
she makes this connection, but rather in her presentation of Kant as
champion of the utter centrality of human finitude to the integrity and
worth of the human moral endeavor. Kant’s account of autonomy
provides support for lines of resistance to the anti-humanist and posthuman options that, in consequence of both real and perceived failures
of modernity, have become part of the landscape of the intellectual
culture of the early twenty-first century.24 Kant’s account offers a basis
for constructing positive alternatives to such options, alternatives that
open possibilities for more adequately addressing, in theory and in
practice, crucial ways in which the forms and dynamics of modernity
have failed to deliver on their once bright promises to bring about
human flourishing. Modernity’s articulation of a reflective awareness of
historicity may justly merit condemnation for making possible its selfconscious appropriation—and even approbation—of humanity’s agency
as prime executioner at history’s slaughter-bench. This does not
require, nonetheless, that the alternative human future be either of
the main possibilities post-humanism puts on offer: on one hand,
numb resignation to the fate of being a transient epiphenomenon of
the dynamics of the cosmos; on the other, the hubris of relentlessly
seeking mastery of the techniques and the technology to bend the
cosmos—or at least our local part of it—to serve wherever may now
be, or in the future emerge, as our dominant human goal and
purposes.25
Central to this line of resistance, as well as to the possibilities
for articulating an alternative robustly affirming the human, is an
appropriation and enlargement of key elements in Kant’s account of
the relationship that contingency bears to the exercise of autonomy
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within the community of human finite agents. This relationship, as I
argue below, first makes it possible to bring into full relief the extent
to which impoverished understandings of both the human and the
divine function within such post and anti-humanist options. It also
makes it possible to articulate alternatives that stand open to
disclosure of what Taylor describes as the hope instanced (though
not exclusively) in “Judeo-Christian theism and in its central promise
of a divine affirmation of the human, more total than humans can ever
attain unaided.”26
On this reading, Kant situates the mutuality of our human
freedom—or, alternately, the reciprocity of our autonomy—as fully
engaged with the contingency of the cosmos, even as it also marks the
moral locus in which we are mutually enabled to transcend it. His
account manifests a deep sense that the common fragility of finite
human freedom stands inextricably coordinate to the dignity that we
must recognize in one another’s humanity in the moral community he
terms the “ethical commonwealth.” These elements function within a
reading of autonomy in which awareness of the reciprocal connections
of freely offered respect within which one stands to all other human
agents—in Kant’s terms, awareness of one’s membership in a
“kingdom of ends”—brings with it a deep sense of the fragility of our
finite freedom. This fragility, I will argue, is exhibited in the exercise of
a finite freedom inextricably enmeshed in the functioning of a world of
contingency, and thus serves as fundamental locus for recognition of
the dignity of our humanity that we are called upon to accord to one
another.
Briefly framed, my argument is that Kant’s recognition of the
inestimable dignity of the power of human freedom to effect good (i.e.,
for bringing about “what ought to be” in a world of “what is”) is equally
a recognition that such power resides in agents who are themselves
profoundly fragile, whose exercise of that power is correspondingly
fragile, yet who are capable of empowering each other’s freedom in
mutual respect for one another’s fragility.27 For Kant, the fragility of
human freedom is inscribed in the embodied conditions of spatiotemporal finitude and contingency. The human power for bringing
about good thoroughly pertains to, and is rooted in, a finite practical
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reason, exercised in a world of contingency that renders that power for
bringing about good both fragmentary and fragile. Such fragmentary
and fragile character is not simply an outcome arising from the limited
scope of the good we each have power to effect; it also arises to the
extent that the endurance of much of the good that we each actually
effect requires that others also do what is needed to sustain it. Kant
recognizes that, insofar as we each stand alone, the exercise of our
freedom provides thin and tenuous protection to our core dignity of
spirit in a world in which the contingency of things gone wrong
intersects with a finite agency that lacks power—and, even more
significantly, the willingness—to effect all that is good.
The ultimate bulwark for our finitude is then not so much the
solitary resoluteness that Murdoch eloquently describes as it is the
mutual recognition and respect we accord each other for the fragile
and vulnerable freedom we each embody. As embodied, moreover, our
freedom is rendered fragile not simply by the inconstancy of intention
that Kant terms the “inversion of our maxims,” nor only by the
inattention and distraction with which we thoughtlessly descend into
evil’s banality, nor by an intent so thoroughly malign that Kant calls it
“diabolical” to mark it as beyond human (im)moral capacity. It is also
rendered fragile by a vulnerability of both body and spirit to violence
and violation. Such vulnerability provides a crucial locus from which to
gain a perspective upon the welcoming hospitality to the other that, as
I shall propose in the next section, constitutes a fundamental social
context within which faith can be constitutively formative of the
agency required for responsible human engagement with the
fragmented world inherited from modernity.
Let me finish this section of my discussion by framing three
major points it has proposed about the structure and exercise of
human moral agency. These points follow from indexing Kant’s
account of autonomy not, as is done in standard narratives of
modernity, to an anthropology of atomistic agency, but rather to what
I call a “social anthropology of human finite freedom.” The first
point is that Kant’s account of autonomy functions within a social
embedding of human agency that is conceived as a structural feature
of human finitude. This point would have once been controversial
among Kant scholars, but a significant body of recent scholarship has
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marshaled an array of interpretive and historical considerations in its
favor. This point has significance beyond indicating a need for
reconsidering the role Kant’s work often plays in accounts of the
emergence of those liberalisms formative of modern moral
individualism.28 Of wider importance than such historical revisionism is
that, once the historical and conceptual legitimacy of a social construal
of autonomy is established, we may then reconfigure–or even put
aside—some bifurcations that the “standard” narratives of modernity
and secularity associate with autonomy, particularly those placing
it on the side of the radical moral subjectivity and individualism
captured in Murdoch’s reference to Milton’s Lucifer or the warfare of
the “state of nature” that Hobbes posits as the abiding baseline of
human social dynamics.
The second and third points then bear upon the relationship
between, on the one hand, the social construal of the structure and
exercise of autonomous agency and, on the other, the conceptual and
moral functions that a recognition of divine transcendence plays within
a human world of contingency and finitude.
The second point is that this social construal of autonomy
repositions the moral import of an acknowledgment of divine
transcendence: such acknowledgment, rather than undermining
human agency, instead encompasses a robust sense of human social
and historical responsibility. It provides a basis for affirming a
fundamental moral priority for the role of humanity, as a mutually
interrelated whole, in shaping the social and cultural history that forms
the distinctively human mode of interaction with the cosmos.29
Acknowledging divine transcendence fully affirms human moral
responsibility for shaping the direction of history and culture.
The third point is that re-contextualizing autonomy so that
social relationality is fundamental to its exercise, shows it to be
embedded in the contingencies of the cosmos and human culture that
mark our human finitude. This embedding of autonomy in contingency
will provide, in the next section, a central locus for the mutual social
engagement of autonomy and faith.
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As with the first point, the latter points each have a dimension
that bears upon the value of Kant’s work as a locus for constructive
theological engagement, as well as a dimension that bears upon
questions about the role of faith in public life. To the extent that Kant
can now be read as providing an account in which an acknowledgment
of divine transcendence affirms human moral responsibility in the
shaping of history, he no longer stands as an “adversary,” who, in
opposing affirmations of divine transcendence issuing from faith, is
intent upon thoroughly replacing religion by secular human moral
practice. His work can now be engaged constructively in relation to
faith in that it affirms faith as a human posture toward transcendence,
one that plays a legitimate constitutive role in shaping autonomous
moral agency.30 Kant’s account is thus an effort not to overcome or
eliminate religion and faith but to exhibit how faith, construed as a
critically formed acknowledgement of divine transcendence, is of
crucial import for the proper exercise of human moral agency.31 Such a
critical acknowledgment of transcendence, shaped in awareness of
“the limits of human reason,” provides the context for rendering
human finitude, exercised as autonomous agency in a world of
contingency, morally intelligible. Kant takes the human relation to
divine transcendence to be that which provides the moral space for
human finite agency to be constitutive—though not solely by itself—of
the trajectory and outcome of history by working to establish a world
community abidingly shaped by the dynamics of the moral reciprocity
of mutual respect.
In addition to re-opening possibilities for Kant as a constructive
theological interlocutor, these points also bear upon the function of
faith in the public life of cultures emergent in the aftermath of
modernity. They help delimit the scope and the configuration of human
responsibility for giving a morally fitting direction to the trajectory of
the socially structured dynamics of public life and culture. Kant aptly
characterizes these dynamics as humanity’s “unsocial sociability,”32
which provides the cultural conditions under which human finite
agency is exercised for effecting good and resisting evil. In situating
the exercise of human moral autonomy in the contingency of both the
cosmos and the workings of human agency, Kant’s account manifests
a deep sense that the common fragility of our finite human freedom,
which runs all the way down in our agency, stands inextricably
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coordinate to the dignity that we must recognize in one another’s
humanity in the moral community he terms the “ethical
commonwealth.”
A relationality deeply embedded in the contingencies of the
cosmos and of our human fragility is thus a key element in a Kantian
anthropology that inscribes human freedom in the embodied
conditions of spatio-temporal finitude. Insofar as we each stand alone,
our finitude provides thin and tenuous protection to our core dignity of
spirit; under these conditions, human power for bringing about good,
rooted in the fragmentary, fragile exercise of finite reason, stands on
the slender and precarious footing of a social relationality embedded in
cosmic contingency. Human fragility stands aware that, in this world of
contingency, it cannot of itself, either individually or communally,
provide enduring stability for an order of what “ought to be,” the order
that fully accords with the dignity and the fragility of our human
embodied spirit.
This awareness, critically shaped by acknowledgment of both
divine transcendence and human finitude, nonetheless brings with it a
two-fold hope enabling us to envision ourselves as responsible agents
shaping the trajectory of history and culture. One element of this hope
is that what we do autonomously (or differently inflected, what we do
in enacting the dignity of our finitude) will have genuine effect in
helping to bring about an enduring order of what ought to be.
The second element is that the stability of such enduring order of what
“ought to be,” even though it lies beyond human finite power to effect
fully in a world of contingency, constantly stands on offer to us, in
virtue of the moral efficacy of our critically formed acknowledgement
of divine transcendence, as the one outcome fully worthy of all we
enact autonomously from the dignity of our finitude.33
This interplay of contingency and hope in relation to a critical
construal of human finitude and divine transcendence pervades Kant’s
philosophical enterprise. The role it plays, moreover, in his account of
cosmopolitanism and perpetual peace as worldly enactments of the
dignity of our autonomous finitude, provides a particularly apt place
from which to make a transition to a discussion of the role of faith in
the public life of a secular age. These accounts help delimit how a
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critically formed acknowledgment of divine transcendence frames a
horizon of hope that is not just personally but also socially necessary
for finite human agents to persevere in efforts to make the world of
human interaction “what it ought to be,” i.e., a world in which human
agents concretely and consistently exhibit the dynamics of shared
membership in “a kingdom of ends.”34 Such hope is necessary
inasmuch as human efforts to make the world into what “it ought to
be” take place in and for a world in which the recalcitrance of the
contingency of “what is” lies so deeply ingrained that it seems to rule
out as unintelligible hopes for the attainment of a social order of
enduring moral reciprocity. For Kant, the prime instance requiring such
(social) perseverance lies in a commitment to establish an
international order of enduring peace, even in the face of the
recalcitrance of human self-preferential obduracy that seems to
support Hobbes’s image of ceaseless war as the baseline for human
social dynamics. Kant marks the moral urgency of establishing an
international order of enduring peace by identifying it as a categorical
imperative that humanity must enjoin upon itself as a species.35 His
urgency in pressing this point suggests that sustaining efforts in
pursuit of a cosmopolitan order of peace is a project within our human
capacity to effect only in virtue of a hope that, embedded in the critical
self-awareness of human moral finitude, brings with it an
acknowledgment of transcendence.
Kant presses the case for humanity to enact a moral
commitment to a cosmopolitan order of peace within an
anthropological horizon shaped by an acknowledgement of
transcendent otherness and human finitude. The final section of this
essay will thus engage the question of the role of faith in public life by
placing the dynamics of the “unsocial sociability” of our human
finitude, as they are enacted in the interplay between our embodied
vulnerability and what Taylor has called “the draw to violence,”36
within that horizon of transcendent otherness and human finitude. I
will propose that one fundamental way in which faith makes it possible
for us to resist the draw to violence lies in its capacity for enabling an
encompassing respect for our shared embodied vulnerability. Faith
provides a locus for a human enacting of the primal grace by which the
divine fully enters the fractured landscape of human contingency: a
hospitality in which the welcoming of one another’s otherness becomes
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so complete that it allows us to accompany each other in and through
the brokenness that marks out the space of human contingency.

II. Enlarging of the Framework of Agency: Faith
and the Welcoming of Otherness
In this concluding section I argue that faith, construed as that
openness from which humans are empowered to stand in finitude and
contingency before the transcendent Otherness of God, offers to the
structure and workings of autonomous moral agency a formative social
context that is particularly fitting for engaging a secular age marked
by the fracturing dynamics of contingency. Faith, on the account
offered here, provides a horizon for recognition of the full range of
otherness—divine, cosmic, and human—within which autonomous
agents are invited to enact, for a world of fracture, modes of healing
unity that do not erase the fragmentation and brokenness of
contingency into an undifferentiated Hegelian Aufhebung but, instead,
render brokenness in all its particularities into graced loci for bringing
about reconciliation.
This argument for faith’s possibilities for empowering an
enlarged social context for the exercise of autonomous agency builds
upon, first, a social reading of autonomy as embedded in a mutual
recognition of agency and expressed in practices of social respect and,
second, the multiple horizons of otherness that have come into view
from the interplay of the dynamics of fracture in the aftermath of
modernity. As a counterpart to this social reading of autonomy, I will
articulate a construal of faith that, in its capacity for attending to the
full range of otherness, provides an enlarged social context for an
autonomous agency referenced to practices of mutual recognition.
Faith, construed this way, offers to the social respect embedded in the
structure of autonomy an enlarged horizon of welcoming the other,
from which our agency is invited to bring social respect to completion
in an inclusive hospitality of reconciliation that engages the full range
of otherness in which our fractured and fragile humanity stands and
participates. In so doing, faith opens possibilities for our agency to
shape practices for resisting the draw to violence that all too often
infects us in encountering one another’s otherness.
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The construal of faith proposed here is thus one for which
hospitality—a trope aptly captured in George Steiner’s remark, “I
believe we must teach other human beings to be guests of each
other”37—is the enacted form of the relationality fundamental to the
bearing that faith has upon agency.38 Particularly helpful for setting
the context for this construal is a counter-trope to hospitality that
Neiman has elegantly proposed as a fitting characterization of the
fragile and deeply fractured dynamics in which humanity seeks moral
and spiritual intelligibility in a “post-modern” condition: “homeless.”
Neiman’s trope puts in bleak terms the consequences of modernity’s
disenchantment of the world, which renders the workings nature of
void of meaning, save in terms an efficient causality absent of
purpose, upon which human instrumental rationality only arbitrarily
gains purchase. We—at least to the extent that modernity remains
deeply etched into our bearing toward the world—now live and act in a
world of nature fully disenchanted of purposes that pay attention to
humanity; even more ominously, we live and act in a world in which
we have become acutely aware of how thoroughly capable we have
become of disenchanting and disengaging ourselves from attention to
our own humanity. “Homeless” captures a sense that we act within a
landscape where not only an indifferent nature fractures human
purposes, but also where something fundamental in ourselves and in
the exercise of our agency has itself been deeply fractured. She
remarks: “Auschwitz revealed the remoteness of humans from
themselves”39 and adds that “Auschwitz was conceptually devastating
because it revealed a possibility in human nature that we
hoped not to see.”40
There is a connection that links these coordinates provided by
Neiman’s trope of “homeless,” a construal of faith through a trope of
“welcoming,” and a social reading of autonomy. This connection is in
the dynamics of mutuality within which each of these coordinates are
embedded, particularly as mutuality functions in the multiple spaces
and varied inflections of cosmic and human contingency.41 Through
this connection of mutuality functioning in the spaces of contingency,
faith offers autonomous agency a capacity for entering into a wider
horizon of engaging otherness, where such engagement can be
enacted as a fully encompassing hospitality.42
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Viewed from this connection in mutuality, Neiman’s trope of
“homeless” exhibits a moral poignancy that powerfully exposes our
individual and systemic failures to exhibit to one another the basic
human reciprocity of mutual welcome in hospitality. The conditions of
living with one another that we have helped shape (sometimes
actively, sometimes by acquiescence) in civic life, in the marketplace,
in the dynamics of religion and of culture, which should be ones
conducive to the flourishing of all, have all-too-often been ones we
have misshaped (as much by inattention as by illintent) to one
another’s detriment. At the outset of the twenty-first century, the
dynamics of so many interactions within our dominant socio-cultural,
political, and economic structures provide scant evidence from which
to glean firm assurance that we, as a species, have yet learned how to
make the space on which we dwell a fitting “home” for one another as
fellow humans, let alone for other living beings with whom we share
the earth. We seem to provide to one another, in the social worlds we
construct to affirm “our” identity over against “theirs,” little to suggest
that we have mastered the skills to share, in a modicum of peace,
even a small space side by side with fellow human beings who are not
the “us” delimited in our parochialisms. Inscribed deep in our failures,
great and small, to welcome the displaced, the uprooted, the
homeless, as well as in the license we often give ourselves to drive
strangers away with coldness, hostility and even violence, is a refusal
to recognize that we, too, stand “homeless” in our human condition
and that, as George Steiner pointedly remarks, all of us “are guests of
life on this crowded polluted planet.”43 Unsure of how welcome we
truly are in the world, even when we stand in a privileged place, our
welcome for others falters, lest opening the door to them bring with it
contingencies that might displace us as well.
Although Neiman offers what looks like an unrelievedly bleak
depiction of our human condition as “metaphysically homeless,” she
still affirms, in accord with a Kantian trajectory of hope, the capacity of
moral reason to empower human imagination for reshaping “the world
as it is” into “the world as it ought to be” and so enact, for and with
one another, some human wholeness for our world. Her account also
aligns with Kant’s articulation of hope as the moral horizon of
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reason in affirming that the human project of rendering the world
morally intelligible by enacting what ought to be is sustained only by
an ordering to a point of reference—an encompassing “ideal”
of the highest good—that functions “transcendentally.” This ideal
frames a trajectory of intelligibility for moral endeavor that is more
encompassing than whatever can be rendered out of any mere
juxtaposition of the fragments of human action from which we seek to
exact moral sense.44
Neiman’s philosophical grammar for this function, it must be
noted, is robustly apophatic—as was Kant’s—with respect to what
modernity has perceived as an incurably onto-theological grammar of
orthodoxy in Christian theology’s affirmation of a transcendent God.
Though not identical to “faith” as I construe it in terms of hospitality
and welcome, Neiman’s reading of “hope” does take a dynamic of
human accompaniment to be central to the attainment of whatever
human wholeness we have the capacity to effect for one another
through our agency. In this she captures a central dimension of Kant’s
cosmopolitan vision pointing us toward the enlargement of mutuality—
particularly in circumstances in which possibilities for mutuality seem
deeply broken or even erased—as a fundamental horizon for sustaining
the exercise of our agency.45
Neiman’s construal of hope locates its moral function in the
attention we pay to the mutuality of our common condition of being
“homeless.” Hope, as the readiness to accompany one another,
particularly in the most shattering circumstances, provides a
fundamental pattern for exhibiting how attention to our mutuality
empowers us to open for one another a welcoming human space upon
which we can dwell with each other in a manner that makes that space
worthy to be called “home.” In following a trajectory that attends to
the moral profundity of human accompaniment Neiman’s account
points in a direction along which we may also plot important
dimensions of a construal of faith indexed to the trope of hospitality.
Hope, in Neiman’s account, is an enacted trajectory of human
accompaniment—of making the world “home” for each other—that
provides the fundamental horizon of moral intelligibility from which to
engage our “homeless” human circumstances. It thereby provides a
At the Limits of the Secular, (2014): pg. 226-249. Publisher Link. This article is © William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company
and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. William B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere
without the express permission from William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

19

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

frame of reference for concluding my account of faith by pointing to
two important points along its trajectory from which faith can be seen
taking form as an “enacted hospitality” of accompaniment. In the first
instance, faith is a response acknowledging the gifted character of
creation as “the hospitality of God.” In accord with this account, the
most fundamental form of “faith” is the hospitality of divine enactment
in the radical originating that brings to be, and continues to sustain,
the dwelling place that is creation itself. This faith has its origin in
God; it is a faith God enacts in the encompassing bringing-to-be that is
creation and that makes creation a “dwelling place.” Creation may
itself thus be viewed as a divine “making room” in which God’s
welcome is given to the abundance of all that God creates.
This dynamic is deeply embedded in the Genesis narrative (Ch
3-4) that eventuates in what Christian theology has long seen, well
before modernity, as a primal instance of the fracturing that renders
us “homeless.” God, the most gracious host, invites the man and the
woman, fashioned in God’s image, to make the garden, expressive of
the abundance of God’s creation, their dwelling place. Yet within that
abundant hospitality, the man and the women make themselves
ungracious guests: They attempt to seize for themselves what is
received rightly only if accepted in response to the Creator’s
graciousness. The narrative then makes manifest that
acknowledgment and acceptance of creation as the radically
originating offer of divine hospitality is a condition for the possibility of
our human enactments of mutuality. So it is altogether fitting that the
next fractures narrated fray and then break the deepest bonds of
human mutuality: The man and the woman set themselves at odds
with one another in passing off blame; far more ominously, Cain,
perceiving no divine welcoming for himself, sunders in brutal murder
his fraternal bond with Abel.
The Genesis narrative provides the negative articulation of what
is most appropriately construed as the positive relation between the
first, originating dimension of faith as the “enacted hospitality” of
God’s accompaniment of creation, and the second, received dimension
of that faith to empower human agency with a capacity to enact
hospitality for one another. Our recognition and affirmation of the
most fundamental form of hospitality as the divine enactment by which
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we now stand as “guests of creation” is what makes it possible for us
to enact the human hospitality by which we become “guests of one
another” in acknowledgment of our mutuality.
It may well be that attention to this fundamental relation
between these two dimensions of faith as “enacted hospitality” lies
behind the importance that many religious traditions attach to
practices in which human solidarity is enacted by welcoming the
stranger at our door. In these practices we learn how our human
status in the world is marked by mutual vulnerability to one another,
all the more so when we meet as strangers to one another.
Hospitality–at least as it has been enacted in the religiously informed
practices of many cultures–is thus far more than a civil, wary,
politeness that allows us to maintain those barriers between “us” and
“them” that are transgressed at peril. It is, instead, the enacted risk of
greeting another’s vulnerability out of our own–and a reciprocal
acceptance of that enacted risk by the one welcomed. Such welcoming
opens up a previously unimagined common ground of mutuality that
allows each of us to stand upon a new space of respect issuing from a
mutual recognition of vulnerability.46
Faith, on this construal, thus takes form as recognition of the
horizon of a divine hospitality that welcomes us into the space of
creation and thereby empowers us to make that space home for
one another.47 In a “secular age” in which so much public space
functions as a place for a zero-sum contention of narrow interests and
“take-no-prisoners” protection of what are all-too-often parochial and
tribal identities, making room for welcoming one another in mutual
vulnerability presents a compelling challenge to our capacities to
exercise agency in full accord with the mutuality that gives agency its
fundamental moral shape. In that context, what I have articulated in
this section is an argument for the role of faith, as enacted hospitality,
in giving our autonomous agency a capacity to address this challenge
to the mutuality that lies at the heart of its moral exercise. In that
role, faith provides a horizon of divine hospitality welcoming us to the
space of creation, so that we may, by our hospitality to one another,
attend to the deep fractures of our “metaphysically homeless” human
condition in ways that allow creation of spaces of mutuality in which
we can enact together what is needed for the overcoming of fracture.
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“Faith,” on the reading I am proposing here, creates a space of
possibilities for us to act with one another, even as we ourselves are
fractured, to heal the fractures of the world. It provides our agency
with a horizon of possibilities for enacting, through welcoming one
another in mutual vulnerability, a more encompassing wholeness to
our humanity and for our world. In a world in which “hospitality” to the
movement of capital resources, armaments, and instrumentally
commodified information has become more valued—and far easier to
“enact”—than hospitality to one’s brother and sister human beings in
their often desperate vulnerability, encouraging a hospitality of mutual
vulnerability may even seem foolish and dangerous. Yet it may very
well be that only in the folly of hospitality will we be enabled to
recognize and articulate the mutual vulnerability that, at least as much
as anything else in our humanity, makes us worthy of respect.

Notes:
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lectures, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (London: Chatto and
Windus, 1992).
Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 76.
Ibid., p. 62, emphasis in original.
Ibid., p. 80.
Ibid., p. 74.
Ibid., p. 75.
Ibid., p. 80.
Ibid., pp. 80-81.
Ibid., p. 89.
Ibid., p. 75.
Put in more formally theological terms, this is a consequence of recognizing
that “creating” is a “mode” of acting that, as properly divine, is
radically different from any human finite “making.” On this point, the
work of David Burrell, Robert Sokolowski, and George Steiner,
provides important considerations for marking this difference and for
engaging its bearing upon the function of belief in contemporary
culture.
Evil in Modern Thought, p. 237. See also Taylor’s remarks in the last two
sections of the concluding chapter of Sources, pp. 513-521.
See, for instance, Stephanos Geroulanos, An Atheism that Is not a
Humanism Emerges in French Thought, (Stanford, 2010).
Who sets these human purposes, and what gives them value, are questions
implicated in a larger discussion of the relation between the divine and
the human.
Sources of the Self, p. 521.
I have developed this point in “Finite Freedom, Fractured and Fragile:
Kant’s Anthropology as Resource for a Postmodern Theology of Grace,”
Philosophie et théologie: Festschrift Emilio Brito, SJ, Bibliotheca
Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium, 206, ed. Éric Gaziaux,
Leuven: Peeters Press, 2007: 47-60; see especially Part III, 54-60.
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This is not to deny the formative role that influential interpretations of
Kant’s work that discounted or ignored the social embedding of
autonomy have played in shaping modern moral individualism; they
clearly had a role. But if a social embedding of autonomy more
accurately represents Kant’s own views, accounts of Kant’s heritage
need to inquire how and why this was lost from view. Kant, moreover,
cannot be fully absolved from blame; as Lewis White Beck, arguably
the most important mid-twentieth century English language Kant
commentator, observed, “It is regrettable that Kant was not more
careful; though, had he been so, the race of Kant commentators would
have been unemployed” (A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical
Reason, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960, p. 221.)
One indication of this repositioning within Kant’s work is that, as the critical
project moves into the 1790s, his discussion of hope shifts focus from
personal immortality toward the final outcome of humanity’s career as
a species.
This is not to be taken to imply that this is the only way to construe faith;
this is a claim about faith viewed from the human side in terms of its
consequences for moral agency. It should not be taken to stand in
opposition to a construal of faith that focuses on its origin in divine
gratuity.
Philip J. Rossi, “Moral Autonomy, Human Destiny, and Divine
Transcendence: Kant’s Doctrine of Hope as a Foundation for Christian
Ethics,” The Thomist 46, 1982: 441-58.
The human “tendency to enter into society, combined, however, with a
thoroughgoing resistance that constantly threatens to sunder this
society” (“Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent” in
Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, trans. Ted Humphrey, Indianapolis;
Hackett, 1983, 32 (KGS Bd. 8: 20).
The second section, “Imagination” of Anthony Godzieba’s essay in this
volume, provides a complementary account of the envisioning of
possibilities with reference to a framing horizon of transcendence.
Rossi, “Cosmopolitanism and the Interests of Reason: A Social Framework
for Human Action in History,” Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie
Kants: Akten des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Vol. 4, ed.
Valerio Rohden, Ricardo R. Terra, Guido A. de Almeida, and Margit
Ruffing, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008: 65-75; “Cosmopolitanism:
Kant’s Social Anthropology of Hope,” Kant und die Philosophie in
weltbürgerlicher Absicht, Proceedings of the XI International Kant
Congress, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter), forthcoming.
Cf. The Metaphysics of Morals, in Kant, Practical Philosophy, pp. 490-491
(KGS Bd. 6: 354-355); “Toward Perpetual Peace,” in Kant, Practical
Philosophy, pp. 325-328 (KGS Bd. 8: 354-357). Kant portrays peace
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as what we might term a “species imperative” bearing upon both the
external social order of justice among nations and the inner social
order of among moral agents construed as an “ethical
commonwealth”; see also Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason,
in Religion and Rational Theology, trans. and ed. Allen Wood and
George di Giovanni, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel
Kant, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 132-133
(KGS Bd. 6:96-98).
Cf. A Secular Age, pp. 656-710.
Theo Hobson, “On Being a Perfect Guest: The Tablet Interview: George
Steiner.” In: The Tablet 259 (August 13, 2005), p.15.
See Rossi, “Sojourners, Guests, and Strangers: The Church as Enactment
of the Hospitality of God,” Questions liturgiques – Liturgical Questions
90, 2009: 121-131.
Evil in Modern Thought, p. 240.
Ibid., p. 254.
See Rossi, “Human Contingency, Divine Freedom, and the Normative Shape
of Saving History,” for Tradition and the Normativity of History, ed.
Lieven Boeve and Terrence Merrigan, Leuven: Peeters Press
(forthcoming), for a discussion of the interplay of two inflections of
contingency, one the contingency of creation’s absolute dependence,
the other the intra-cosmic contingency of uncertain outcome.
Mary Doak’s essay in this volume indicates how Benedict XVI’s relational
account of the human, grounded on a Trinitarian theology, traces a
complementary trajectory placing priority on a welcoming openness to
those most in need.
Hobson, “On Being a Perfect Guest: The Tablet Interview: George Steiner”,
in The Tablet 259, August 13, 2005, p. 14.
She specifies this function as a “regulative” one.
Kant’s exemplary instance of this enlargement of the horizon of mutuality
for sustaining the exercise of our moral agency is his identifying (in
The Metaphysics of Morals) the imperative “There is to be no war” as
categorical, “even if there is not the slightest theoretical likelihood that
it can be realized” (Practical Philosophy, p. 491; KGS Bd. 6: 354).
These practices may also be seen as loci for the enactment of what David
Tracy, in his contribution to this volume, terms a “disclosive truth”
issuing from the dynamics of “Publicness Two.” In addition, to the
extent that the truth herein disclosed bears upon the possibility of
enacting a welcoming embrace of otherness, particularly in
circumstances of a “homeless” postmodernity in which the other is
seen first and foremost as threat, these practices may also display the
interruptive “excess” at work in what he terms “Publicness Three.”
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A full theological account of the “divine hospitality” and its engagement in
human vulnerability would trace its trajectory through the doctrinal
loci of creation, incarnation, and resurrection; for an adumbration of
this, see the fourth section of Godzieba’s essay in this volume and
Rossi, “Human Contingency, Divine Freedom, and the Normative
Shape of Saving History,” [n. 40]). There is, moreover, a dynamic in
the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius along this trajectory, most
notably in the meditation on the Incarnation at the beginning of the
Second Week and in the concluding contemplatio ad amorem.
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